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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
THOMAS F. THATCHER, KATHLYN J.
THATCHER,
Appellate Case No. 20060538 CA
District Court Civil No. 050908816

Defendants/Appellants,
and
RICHARD GROW and TODD LLOYD,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action is within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the
Court of Appeals on June 13, 2006, as authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Was the district court correct in ruling that Allstate Indemnity Company
("Allstate") had no duty to defend the Thatchers in the lawsuit filed by Richard Grow
and Todd Lloyd because the allegations in the complaint, if proven, were not covered
under the Thatchers' homeowners' policy?
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Standard of Review: Rulings on summary judgment motions are reviewed for
correctness. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, | 11, 27
P.3d 555. "Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law; thus, the Court
of Appeals accords the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the contract no deference
and reviews them for correctness." Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc.,
1999UT69,t6,983P.2d575.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case,
In May 2003, the Thatchers hired a company named Sport Court to build a sports
court and fence on their property. After the sports court was constructed, it was
discovered that a portion of the sports court and fence encroached upon a portion of the
adjoining property owned by Richard Grow and Todd Lloyd ("Grow and Lloyd"). In
addition, Grow and Lloyd discovered that fill from the construction had been dumped on
their property. Grow and Lloyd filed a lawsuit (the "Lawsuit") against the Thatchers,
stating that the Thatchers had refused to remove the structures from their property and
bring it into compliance with applicable zoning laws. As a result, Grow and Lloyd
suffered damages because they were unable to sell the lot and the home they had built on
it for a prospective buyer. Initially, the Thatchers personally hired an attorney to defend
them in the lawsuit but on April 14, 2005, they tendered their defense to Allstate under
their homeowners' policy (the "Policy").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After investigation, Allstate determined that the Policy did not provide coverage
for the claimed losses in the Lawsuit and therefore, Allstate was not obligated to pay for
a defense or indemnification losses claimed in the Lawsuit. This information was
conveyed to the Thatchers in a letter dated May 5, 2005. Allstate then filed a declaratory
judgment action, which is the subject of this appeal, to determine whether the Thatchers
had any right to a defense or indemnification under the Policy. In the meantime, Allstate
agreed to defend the Thatchers in the Lawsuit under a reservation of rights until the court
ruled as to whether or not the Thatchers' losses were covered under the Policy, thus
triggering Allstate's duty to defend.
It is important to note that since this appeal was filed, the Lawsuit was dismissed,
sua sponte, on October 30, 2006. (See Addendum.) Upon learning of the dismissal,
Allstate's counsel spoke to counsel for Grow and Lloyd who was unaware of the
dismissal and indicated that he would try to get the dismissal set aside. As it stands
today, even though Allstate has been providing a defense in the Lawsuit since the
defense was tendered to them by the Thatchers, any continuing duty to defend, as well as
this appeal, may rendered moot by the dismissal of the Lawsuit.
Course of Proceedings.
Allstate filed a Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment on May 13, 2005 and then
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 12, 2005.

The Thatchers

responded with their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on October 25, 2005.
A hearing was held on March 13, 2006, before Judge Stanton Taylor, who was filling in
for Judge Stephen Roth. Judge Taylor ruled from the bench in favor of Allstate. The
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Thatchers filed a Motion for New Trial on March 24, 2006, which was denied by the
court in an order entered on May 9, 2006. This appeal followed.
Disposition.
The trial court granted Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and declared
that Allstate has no duty to defend or Indemnify under the Policy. The trial court also
denied the Thatchers' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On January 31, 2003, Allstate and the Thatchers entered into an agreement
whereby Allstate agreed to provide homeowners' insurance to the Thatchers for their
residential property. (R. 12) On or about November 26, 2003, Grow and Lloyd, owners
of a parcel of property adjacent to the Thatchers' property, filed the Lawsuit against the
Thatchers. (R. 49-52) In the Lawsuit, Grow and Lloyd allege that the Thatchers, without
a permit, built a sports court and fence that encroached on their property. (R. 50) Grow
and Lloyd also allege that the Thatchers unlawfully deposited fill on their property. (R.
50) The encroachment occurred while Grow and Lloyd were building a custom home
under contract for a specific buyer. (R. 50) They demanded that the Thatchers move the
encroachment but the Thatchers refused. (R. 50) Grow and Lloyd also allege that the
Thatchers knew they were in danger of losing the contract and that their continued refusal
to remove the encroachment would likely result in the loss of the sale. (R. 50) As a
result of the encroachment and the refusal by the Thatchers to remove the encroachment,
Grow and Lloyd lost the sale. (R. 50).
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Grow's and Lloyd's cause of action is intentional trespass resulting from the
Thatchers knowingly and intentionally encroaching on their property in the first place and
then intentionally refusing to remove the encroachment and bring the structure into
compliance with applicable zoning laws. (R. 51)
The Thatchers contacted Allstate regarding the Lawsuit and tendered their defense
to Allstate on or about April 14,2005. Allstate reviewed the allegations in the Lawsuit to
determine whether the Policy provided coverage for the claims and on May 5, 2005,
Allstate sent the Thatchers a letter (the "Letter") explaining why the Policy does not
provide coverage for the claimed losses in the Lawsuit and therefore, that Allstate is not
obligated to pay for a defense in that Lawsuit or to pay indemnification losses claimed in
the Lawsuit. (R. 53-7) In that Letter, Allstate agreed to defend the Thatchers in the
Lawsuit under a reservation of rights until the court ruled, in this declaratory judgment
action, as to whether or not the Thatchers are entitled to a defense and indemnification
under the Policy. (R. 53-7)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under any construction of the facts alleged in the underlying complaint, Allstate
does not have a duty to defend. The Thatchers do not dispute that property damage
occurred nor do they dispute that building the sports court and fence were intentional
acts. The crux of the case boils down to two issues: (1) Whether the property damage
caused by the Thatchers, as alleged in the underlying complaint, can be construed as an
"accident" and therefore, covered under the Policy; and (2) whether the results of the
Thatchers' actions fall under the exclusions for covered losses.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
ALLSTATE HAS NO DUTY TO DEFEND BECAUSE THE
UNDERLYING CLAIMS, IF PROVEN, WOULD NOT BE COVERED
UNDER THE POLICY.
The district court was correct in ruling that Allstate had no duty to defend the

Thatchers in the Lawsuit initiated against them by Grow and Lloyd because the claims in
the Lawsuit, if proven, would not fall under the terms of the Policy. An insurer's duty to
defend is based on the language of the policy and the nature of the claim against the
insured; a defense duty arises when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential
liability under the insurance policy. Sharon Steel Corp, v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997) (citing Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986)). This potential
obligation is determined by referring to the allegations in the underlying complaint. Id.
When those allegations, if proved, could result in liability under the policy, then the
insurer has a duty to defend. Id.
An insurer denying a duty to defend must establish that the claims fall outside the
coverage of the policy or the claims are exempted from coverage. Id. (citations omitted).
The duty to defend is determined by comparing the language of the policy with the
allegations in the complaint and is determined by the terms of the policy, not by the
expectations of the insured. Id. (emphasis added). See also Pixton v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). As shown below, there are
several reasons why Allstate does not have a duty to defend based on the terms of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

Policy.
A.

The Allegations in the Underlying Complaint Do Not Constitute An
Accident And Therefore, Are Not An Occurrence Covered by the
Policy.

In order for the Thatcher's encroachment, or trespass, to be covered under the
Policy, it must be considered an occurrence. "Occurrence" is defined in paragraph 9 of
Definitions Used In This Policy as:
"Occurrence" - means an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury or
property damage.
(R. 107) (emphasis added). To fall within the policy's definition of occurrence, and thus
within the scope of coverage, the property damage must have resulted from an
"accident." Under this analysis, the question then becomes whether the focus should be
on the intentional act of building the sports court or as the Thatchers argue, the
unintended result of encroaching on their neighbor's property.
In determining whether an act was sudden and accidental, it is the nature of the
act itself, and not the result, that must be analyzed.

Fire Insurance Exchange v.

Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App 1997), overruled in part by Benjamin v.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, f 23, n.3, 140 P.3d 1210. The Thatchers rely on a
variety of cases from other jurisdictions to support their position that negligent
trespassing is covered by the Policy but the Court is not obligated to follow those cases.
In Deseret Savings, the court relied on a Nebraska case in which an insured
constructed a warehouse in the flood plain of a creek. In a suit brought by a nearby
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property owner to declare the warehouse a nuisance and remove it, the court held that the
insurer could have no liability under the policy since any resulting damage would be
intended and thus not an "occurrence," even though its owner had no intention of
causing harm to nearby properties. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986)(citing Millard Warehouse
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 283 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1979) (emphasis added).
More importantly, the Millard court noted that "where acts are voluntary and
intentional and injury is the natural result, the result was not caused by an
"accident" even though the result might have been unexpected, unforeseen, and
unintended." Millard, 283 N.W.2d at 62-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
Millard court further reasoned that "the lack of intent to do harm on the part of the
actor does not by itself compel conclusion that result was caused by "accident" for
purposes of liability policy" and added that "[a]n effect which is the natural and
probably consequence of an intentional act or of a course of action is not an
"'accident/" Id. (emphasis added).
At issue in Green v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 2005 UT App 564,
127 P.3d 1279 was whether a subdivision developers' failure to disclose the risk of a
landslide to a subdivision lot purchaser was covered under the developer's insurance
policy.

The court held that the failure to disclose the risk, whether intentional or

negligent, was not an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and thus the insurer
owed no duty to defend. Id. An insurer's duty to defend is measured by the nature and
kinds of risks covered by the policy and arises whenever the insurer ascertains facts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which give rise to potential liability under the policy. Id. at % 32.
However, it is irrelevant whether the Thatchers were negligent or intentional in
their encroachment. The Thatchers' alleged lack of intent still does not qualify their
actions as accidental and therefore, an occurrence, requiring a defense or insurance
coverage.
B.

The Thatchers' Intentional Acts Are Excluded From Coverage Even If
the Results of Their Actions Are Unintended or Unforeseeable.

Although Allstate asserts that it has no obligation to defend the Thatchers in the
Lawsuit because the underlying allegations, if proven, would not result in liability under
the Policy, the Thatchers argue that their actions constitute negligence and therefore, an
"accident" covered under the Policy. Even if the Thatchers' trespass was negligent, the
consequences of their actions are still not covered under the Policy.
The Policy excludes coverage for intentional acts even if the damage is different
than reasonably expected:
9.

Intentional or criminal acts of or at the direction of any
insured person, if the loss that occurs:
a) may be reasonably expected to result from such acts;
or
b) is the intended result of such acts.

(R. 110) The Policy also states the following regarding intentional acts:
Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverage X:
1.
We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage
intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result
from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any
insured person. This exclusion applies even if:
a) such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or
her conduct;
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b) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different
kind or degree than intended or reasonably expected; or
c) such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a
different person than intended or reasonably expected.
(R. 123) (emphasis addedd). It is clear under the Policy that intentional acts are not
covered, even if the result was different from what was expected or reasonably foreseen
by the Thatchers.
The Thatchers argue that even though their actions in building the sports court was
intentional, the resulting damage to the adjoining property was unintentional.

The

Thatchers also argue that unforeseen consequences of intentional acts qualify as
accidents. The Thatchers rely on Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg. Their reliance
is misplaced.
In Rosenberg, the court concluded that all unintentional or accidental acts resulting
in injury are considered accidents constituting occurrences under liability insurance
policies. Id. at 1204-05. The court further explained that an injury caused by an
intentional act may also be considered an accident constituting an occurrence under a
liability insurance policy if the injury could not be "reasonably anticipated or expected"
from the deliberate act. Id. at 1205-06.
However in Benjamin, which overruled Rosenberg in part, the court, examined
Rosas v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 414, 82 P.3d 185 {overruled in part by Benjamin v. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, % 23, n.3, 140 P.3d 1210) with regard to the duty to defend.
In Rosas, the court held that an insurer had no duty to defend an assault claim brought
against its insured because "the facts alleged in the complaint clearly demonstrate that a
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cause of action based solely on an intentional tort was intended.5' Id. at % 23. (citations
omitted). The Benjamin court emphasized that "the appropriate inquiry is whether the
complaint alleges claims sounding in negligence. To the extent that the underlying facts
in any given case do not satisfy the elements of a claim for negligence, the negligence
claim will be subject to dismissal." Id. at % 23, n.3. In Benjamin and Rosas, the
complaint asserted alternative claims sounding in both intentional tort and negligence.
That is not the situation here.
The important distinction that is similar to the complaint filed by Grow and Lloyd
is the allegation of the tort of intentional trespass. The allegations in the Lawsuit describe
only intentional acts in that the Thatchers refused to remove the sports court and fence
despite being asked to do so, both by Salt Lake City (for failing to comply with zoning
regulations) and by Grow and Lloyd. Grow and Lloyd have not alleged a separate,
alternative claim for relief sounding in negligence and it is not the function of the court in
this declaratory judgment action to resolve the claims in the Lawsuit. The complaint in
the Lawsuit must be taken at face value. Therefore, there are no negligence allegations or
claims in the Lawsuit and intentional acts are clearly not covered by the Policy, either as
an accident or under the intentional acts exclusion.
The Thatchers do not dispute that building the sports court was intentional. Even
if the encroachment was negligent and therefore different from what was expected or
reasonably foreseen, the resulting damage is still not covered under the Policy. The
Thatchers also argue that they relied on Sport Court to determine the property line and
get the necessary permits. This still does not bring the Thatchers' actions under Policy
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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coverage because the Thatchers directed the building of the sports court, even though the
act of building the sports court was performed by someone else.
II.

THE COURT'S DECISION WAS WELL-REASONED AND
SHOULD STAND.

Finally, the Thatchers argue that the trial court relied on an isolated sentence in
Green v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. to determine that the claims alleged in the
Lawsuit must be construed as an intentional act and not an "occurrence." The Thatchers
claim that the court erroneously applied current case law in reaching its decision.
However, the Green case was not the deciding factor in the court's decision but merely
the most recent case in a line of well-developed case law in Utah regarding the issues
surrounding an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify. There is no evidence that the
trial court relied exclusively on Green in making its decision. The court correctly ruled
that the placement of the sports court and fence by the Thatchers was an intentional act,
precluding coverage under the Policy.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, Allstate does not have a duty to defend the
Thatchers in the Lawsuit. The complaint in the lawsuit alleges that the Thatchers
"knowingly and intentionally" trespassed on Grow's and Lloyd's property.

The

complaint also alleges that this trespass occurred because of the Thatchers' intentional
acts. It is important to note that the complaint alleges that the Thatchers' failure to
remove the sports court and fence once they discovered it was on the adjoining property
caused the damages to Grow and Lloyd. This continued intentional encroachment is
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what led to devaluation of the adjoining property and potential profit from the sale of the
property. These intentional acts are simply not occurrences covered under the Policy.
Even though, as the Thatchers claim, these intentional acts produced unintended results,
it falls under the exclusions listed in the Policy. Finally, the Lawsuit was dismissed on
October 30, 2006, rendering the issue of whether Allstate has a duty to defend and this
appeal moot unless counsel in the Lawsuit refiles a complaint or gets the dismissal set
aside. As of today, neither event has happened. Allstate respectfully requests that this
Court affirm the decision of the trial court in favor of Allstate.
Dated this 15th day of November, 2006.
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

l^XkJlMA^
Tim Dalton Dunn
Kathleen M. Liuzzi
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD GROW,

: ORDER OF DISMISSAL
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

Case No: 030926692 MI

THOMAS THATCHER,
Defendant.

: Judge:
: Date:

JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
October 30,2006

Based on the failure of the parties and/or counsel to respond to
the Order to Show Cause, the Court orders this case be dismissed
without prejudice.

Dated this %£}

day of

tjcAcfhpS

, 2 0 £Lg-
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